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INTRODUCTION
Labor problems of the transportation industry have been given a great deal of
publicity during the past year. Most of the major American airlines have been
shut down by strikes of one group or another in the recent past.1 James Hoffa
and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters have been starring in congres-
sional hearings, court proceedings, and television shows, as well as in magazine
and newspaper stories. Local transit labor disputes have been on the front pages
in several of the largest cities. A brief boycott of "runaway" ship lines seems to
be the prelude to a world-wide maritime labor conflict. Railway management
officials fired in February 1959 the first gun in what has become the most serious rail-
way labor dispute in a generation,' while unemployment, though less pub-
licized, is among the most critical of current transportation problems
These situations have not arisen suddenly; the problems now boiling over
have been heating up for a long time. Most of them are current manifestations of
continuing conflicts, closely related to underlying economic and governmental condi-
tions. Some types of labor problems are common to all industry, but each in-
dustry's problems have peculiar features arising out of its own individual char-
acteristics. This is particularly true of transportation. Its special features, though
doubtless well known, should be recalled in summary as a preliminary to any
consideration of new legislation affecting transportation employment.
Physically, the several divisions of the industry are engaged in the transporta-
tion: (a) of goods and passengers; (b) by ship, airplane, train, and motor truck
and bus; and (c) either locally, between cities, nationally, or internationally. From
a strictly economic point of view, these forms of transportation may be considered
either as competitive with one another or as supplementary. Integration of all
types of transportation is industrially feasible; the Canadian Pacific transportation
system owns and operates rail lines, air lines, bus lines, truck lines, and ships on
the Great Lakes and both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Canadian Na-
tional Railway, owned by the Canadian Dominion Government, is the center of
a similarly integrated transportation system, the two integrated systems competing
throughout the country. Government regulation in the United States has insured
*A.B. 1918, University of Minnesota. Head, Washington Office, Labor Bureau of Middle West.
1 Traffic World, Dec. 6, x958, pp. 15, 42; id., Jan. 17, 1959, p. 21.
2 z959 Target: Featherbedding, Railway Age, Feb. 16, 1959, p. 9; Management 'Featherbed'?, id., Feb.
23, 1959, PP. 1o, 58.
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that, with few exceptions, each of these various types of transportation facilities is
owned and operated separately from the others.
Historically, these transportation media were developed separately, and each
of them in segments. Highways, railways, airlines, and waterways were built
to connect particular localities, or to serve specific needs. Their subsequent link-
ing into through routes made manifest the duplications, gaps, and circuitous
courses that resulted from piece-meal construction. The distribution of industries
and population, particularly in the West, was largely determined by the avail-
ability of transportation, and that distribution later tended to perpetuate existing
transportation routes. Many of the major problems of the railroad industry and
its employees have their origin in efforts to correct the results of unplanned early
railroad expansion.
Added to these physical, economic, and industrial characteristics, as a major
factor in the settling of labor relations, is the dominating public interest in safe,
efficient, uninterrupted, economical, adequate, and nondiscriminatory transporta-
tion service. The public interest led, in turn, to the elaboration of a complex web
of governmental regulation, at every level and over every form of transportation.
Though the regulation was occasioned by public reaction to high rates, discrim-
inations, and other abuses in early transportation history, it has not all been nega-
tive or prohibitory. In particular, governmental assistance or subsidy has been a
factor in the development and maintenance of all types of transportation facilities;
in local transit, public ownership and operation have become the predominant prac-
tice in the largest American cities.
This network of governmental regulation has a multiple relationship to trans-
portation employees. Part of the network deals directly with labor conditions, but
every regulation of any section of the industry inevitably has at least an indirect
effect upon the employees. Labor organizations, particularly those of railway
workers, have tried to influence governmental regulation in a manner that would
minimize its harmful effects on their members. Railway unions have led all
labor, in some instances, in establishing basic labor rights; and in other instances,
they have gained substantial improvements through legislation or administrative
action. This complex relationship between transportation unions and the various
forms of government regulation of the industry must be kept in mind in con-
sidering additional legislation on any transportation labor problem.
Another significant factor, tying in with existing governmental regulation,
is that the form of labor organization has mirrored the divisions, structure, and
history of the transportation industry. There are two major divisions in the form
of labor organization, and there is a parallel division in the governmental handling
of labor conditions.
In the three sections of the industry that are most definitely national in scope-
the railways, airlines, and waterways-labor organization is predominantly on a
craft basis. There are twenty standard international railway labor unions; there
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are at least three separate organizations of airline flight personnel, and separate
craft unions of nonoperating employees; there are separate organizations of
licensed and unlicensed maritime workers, separate craft organizations of ship-
maintenance men, and separate unions of longshoremen. In each of these three
types of transportation, the men who operate the vehicles are in the minority;
they are outnumbered by clerical, maintenance, and other groups by four or five
to one. The fact that these operating men are in the minority, but have the
greatest collective bargaining power, led to their separate organization. On the
railways, only the train and engine service groups and the telegraphers had the
power to organize and win bargaining rights in the era when both government
and employers were most determined in opposition. Operating groups in all
three of these sections of the industry have felt that inclusion in a general union,
where they would be greatly outnumbered, would dilute their bargaining power
and would not give as favorable action on their wage rates or as good an under-
standing or handling of their special working conditions as could be secured.
through craft action.
Each of these three sections of the industry has its own separate unions of
operating employees. Some nonoperating unions, on the other hand, have mem-
bership in all of these (and to some extent in other) sections of the industry.
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Order of Railroad Conductors.
and Brakemen, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and the Switchmen's Union of North Amer-
ica are limited, almost entirely, to the railroad industry;4 the International Associa-
tion of Machinists, on the other hand, has membership among maintenance
workers in all three of these sections of the industry, and the Brotherhood of
Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees
also represents airline employees of the classes listed in the union name.
Labor conditions of employees of railways, airlines, and waterways are federally
regulated, with the first two groups coming under the Railway Labor Act.5
Legislation somewhat similar to this Act, governing labor relations in the mer-
chant marine, was adopted in 1936,6 but expired by its own terms in 1941 and
was not extended. In each of these sections of the industry, other federal regulation
affects the employees, directly and indirectly.
The make-up of the labor force in motor-truck and bus and street-car trans-
portation is basically different from that of rail, air, and water transportation-
In local transit (a term used to include street-car, bus, subway and elevated serv-
ice), operating employees outnumber nonoperating by three to one. The same is-
true in over-the-road bus transportation. Truck drivers also outnumber non-
operating employees in truck transportation, both local and intercity. Neither
' There are exceptions; the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen does have, for example, a number of-
agreements covering intercity bus drivers.
S44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), A5 U.S.C. §§ I51-88 (1952).
652 Stat. 965 (expired June 23, 1941).
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bus nor truck operating employees need be afraid of domination by nonoperating
crafts. Local transit and over-the-road bus employees are organized in industrial
union form-the great bulk of them in the Amalgamated Association of Street,
Electric Railway, and Motor Coach Employes of America. Truck drivers, helpers,
and warehouse and storage employees, with some other nonoperating employees,
are in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a craft union in form, but
almost industrial in intercity truck transportation. Although hours of service of
intercity bus and truck drivers are limited by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, under the Interstate Commerce Act, there is no federal regulation of col-
lective bargaining, and no machinery for the settlement of labor disputes, for
motor-bus or truck employees, except that which applies to all labor. Some states
do have special statutory regulation of collective bargaining in local transit, and
cities where transit facilities are publicly-owned have various provisions for fixing
wages and working conditions (usually by collective bargaining, with one or
another type of arbitration for ultimate settlement of disputes).
The Amalgamated Association has in its international constitution the require-
ment that its local unions must propose arbitration in any dispute that cannot
be settled in negotiation; strikes are prohibited unless arbitration has been rejected
by management. This constitutional requirement has been accompanied by agree-
ments with management-or by equivalent action of local public-transit authorities
-specifically providing for arbitration not alone of grievances, but also of dis-
putes arising out of proposals for change in wages or working conditions. In
motor-trucking, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters does have arbitration
agreements but relies principally upon direct economic power in its collective bar-
gaining with employers.
I
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Among these divisions of the transportation industry, the airlines have been
most involved in strikes during 1958 and 1959. Five major airlines were forced to
suspend operations because of strikes in that period-American Airlines, Capital
Airlines, Trans World Airlines, Eastern Air Lines, and Western Air Lines. Taken
together, these airlines constitute fifty per cent of the air transportation industry.
In each of those disputes, except that involving Western Air Lines, the full pro-
cedures of the Railway Labor Act were followed, including hearings before presi-
dential emergency boards. Whether or not the National Mediation Board and
the emergency boards functioning under the Act can be blamed for failing to
bring about peaceful settlement of these disputes, the fact remains that they were
unsuccessful.
The Railway Labor Act was originally drawn, and has since been amended,
primarily to fit the needs of the railway industry. Congress, and the public gen-
erally, was so impressed with the early success of the Act that it seemed only
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necessary to add a title bringing air transportation under the Act to assure peace
in that field. A similar suggestion was made, but abandoned, with respect to
the maritime industry. Tide two, covering airlines and their employees, was
added to the Railway Labor Act in 1936.7
The fallacy in this extension of the Act has now become clear. Railway man-
agements and unions had had long experience in collective bargaining when they
drew up the original Railway Labor Act together in 1926. Both were accustomed
to joint national action. Their maturity has been the principal factor in the success
of the law. But the consummate ability of the late Dr. William M. Leiserson,
Chairman of the National Mediation Board from 1934 to 1939, and in 1943 to
1944 (at a time when airline labor problems were of minor importance), was
largely responsible for the development of Board procedures fitted to the needs
and character of the railway industry. Neither airline managements nor the
organizations of flight personnel have the collective bargaining experience pre-
supposed by Railway Labor Act procedures. Moreover, the National Mediation
Board cannot now, without neglect of railway labor relations, undertake the
adaptation of its staff and procedures to the very different conditions on the air-
lines.
Among those conditions is the failure, thus far, of both airline labor organiza-
tions and airline companies to develop necessary co-operation among themselves.
Separate unions, bargaining separately with individual airlines on wages and
working conditions that should at least be co-ordinated, present an almost in-
superable problem to the kind of mediation or emergency board procedure con-
templated in the Railway Labor Act. Separate collective bargaining at the
moment has the further handicap that officers of one leading airline union fear
impending technological change will lessen employment opportunities for their
members-and are, accordingly, determined to take over at any cost the work
done by members of another union. The absolute economic power of that "raid-
ing" union makes its jurisdictional claim a menace to the industry and its patrons.
Under these circumstances, serious consideration should be given to the creation
of a separate agency, by agreement or by law, to handle labor disputes on the
airlines. Managements and unions alike should have learned from the "recent
unpleasantness" that they must join in developing effective procedures for settling
labor disputes. It is not appropriate here to suggest how those procedures should
depart from accepted railway practice, but certainly much greater emphasis should
be given to the encouragement of voluntary arbitration. Either the Secretary
of Labor, the National Mediation Board, or the Senate Labor Committee might
initiate an effort to get joint acceptance of new legislation if effective disputes
procedure cannot be set up by agreement. Public hearings might point the way
to such legislation, even if management and employees could not reach complete
agreement on its provisions. In any case, it would be extremely unwise to base
7 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. §§ x81-88 (1952)-
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any amendment of the Railway Labor Act on these airline strikes, except whatever
amendment is necessary to make explicit and definite the separation of railway and
,airline disputes machinery and procedure.
Air transportation will certainly increase greatly during the next decade.
National dependence upon air transportation will perhaps never be so great as
upon surface transportation, but the experience of the last years demonstrates that
airline strikes can cause extreme inconvenience and heavy financial losses to the
public served. Airline employees have been most unfairly dealt with on many
occasions, and airline companies have suffered from unnecessary interunion fric-
tion. The whole field of airline labor relations should be carefully reconsidered
by unions, managements, and public authorities to provide greater assurance of
effective collective bargaining during the period of expansion of the industry just
ahead. The latest series of disputes gave reason to believe that safety of air trans-
portation is involved in airline labor relations. Whatever machinery and pro-
cedure is established for handling such disputes not only must be fitted to other
characteristics of the industry, but must, above all, provide for definite, fair, tech-
nically sound, and final settlement of any question affecting safety of operations-
either within the collective bargaining- process itself or by reference to other airline
regulatory agencies.
II
THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY
The absence of federal regulation of collective bargaining in motor-truck trans-
portation similar to that applying to railways and airlines is probably attributable
to the fact that this mode of transportation has only recently become really significant
nationally. In 1946, motor trucks handled 81,6ooooo ton-miles of intercity freight,
or 8.65 per cent of the United States' total.8 In 1957, intercity motor truck traffic
was 261,oooooo ton-miles, or 19.3 per cent of the United States' total.0 Rail traffic
totalled 643,oooooo ton-miles in 1946 and 626,oooooo ton-miles in 1957. Intercity
truck traffic has thus increased from 12.7 per cent to 41.7 per cent of rail freight
traffic in eleven years. But motor-truck labor problems are growing even faster
than their operations.
Publicity attendant on the investigations of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and its officials may have obscured the fact that there are two major
problems being outlined. The first lies in any misdeeds of which the officials
may be guilty. The second lies in the danger of national labor conflict in the
industry. The two, of course, are interrelated, in that if the union is in fact
controlled by dishonest men, there is danger that destructive strikes may be called
without real justification or for improper purposes.
The central fact is that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters was organ-
ized and adapted to function locally, especially in the construction industry. That
'ICC, STATEMENT No. 544, INTERCITY ToN-MILEs 1939-1952, at 4, 6, tables 2 and 3 (1954).
SICC 72D ANN. REP. 10 (958).
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industry, like many service trades and small-scale manufacturing industries, was
characterized by ruthless, anarchic competition. Imposition of "slave and starve"
labor conditions by some employers was often a part of that competition. The
sweat shop in the apparel industries was one of the worst illustrations of those
conditions. Neither local nor federal government did anything effective to prevent
unfair competition or maintain order. The result was that owners and labor
organizations themselves began to police their industries by whatever means were
available. Local truck drivers were an important factor in those efforts at self-
regulation. Not unnaturally, these police operations frequently led to abuses, by
individual businessmen as well as individual union officials. Nonlegal sanctions
for more or less legitimate purposes merged into illegal coercion for indefensible
purposes. The unofficial police sometimes became violent and corrupt-which has
happened, occasionally, even to official police. Some of the methods of legitimate
self-policing employed by business and labor groups were also used with modifica-
tions to set up and operate "rackets."
Another conditioning factor is that union organizing efforts in the years when
the Teamster pattern was being set were met with violence, bribery, frame-ups, and
all the techniques in the manual of the private detective agency, often with the
assistance of local judges, police, and public officials. Union representatives fought
back, and some of them "bettered the instruction" of employer representatives.
Being arrested for union activity was no disgrace in that era. Building trades
workers were organized in such continuing savage warfare.
Whatever the reasons, there has been too much violence and corruption in the
,construction industry, as well as in other local industries, in many communities.
Labor relations have been infected with the malady, and the teamsters have not
been immune. Teamster union officials exposed to and trained for such local con-
-ditions have suddenly become national officials with great responsibility in a major
section of the transportation industry. The industry is national, though national
collective bargaining has not yet begun; even regional bargaining is a very recent
development. Teamster officials have come from their local battles "not in entire
forgetfulness" and certainly not "trailing clouds of glory." They have not yet
learned or adapted themselves to the ethical standards of other national trans-
portation unions-unions that have been free up to now from any suggestion of
corruption. Those other unions, and American labor generally, are bringing
tremendous pressure to bear upon the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, at
all levels, to "clean house." Congress has passed legislation seeking to deal with
abuses of the kind revealed in the McClellan Committee investigations.1°  The
danger, of course, is that in the effort to clean up the enfants terribles of the labor
movement, the legislation may be such as to "toss the baby out with the bath
water."
" Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519.
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The second half of the motor-truck labor situation needs immediate attention.
Congress might well consider legislation to facilitate the' peaceful settlement of
disputes affecting intercity motor transportation of commodities. There is 'little
likelihood of getting co-operation in drafting such legislation between the industry
and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (analogous to that in the railway
industry preceding the passage of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 referred to
above). But in view of the rapid development of the industry and the character
of its collective-bargaining relations, some beginning at least should be made.
Here, again, it is important that the handling of railway labor disputes not be
jeopardized by the addition of a motor-truck section to the Railway Labor Act,
although its basic principles could be adapted to truck transportation." Under
a separate administrative agency, perhaps the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, motor-truck legislation might well include specific provision for media-
tion, voluntary arbitration, and governmental fact-finding, with prohibition of
strikes or lockouts until such procedures had been followed. The effect of such
legislation not only would be a regularizing of collective bargaining and a pro-
tection to the public, but would also lessen the opportunity for any "undesirable"
among teamster union officials to misuse his power by threatening or calling
"quickie" strikes for improper objectives.
The need for such legislation was not really increased by the announced in-
tention of James Hoffa, President of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
to set up a Conference of Transportation Unity in alliance with other transporta-
tion unions. Maritime or waterfront labor organizations might find the assistance
of the teamsters' union of great value in some of their current disputes with
ship operators. But alliance with those unions would add very little to the
economic power of the teamsters. Only by inducing railway labor to accept his
leadership, or at least to work with him, could Mr. Hoffa increase significantly
the power of his own organization. No one with the slightest knowledge of the
railway unions, their leadership, their policies, or their history could entertain for
a moment the idea that such an alliance is possible. Mr. Hoffa himself must
know that he could not get railway labor co-operation. He should have realized,
also, that the threat of a comprehensive transportation labor alliance under his
leadersip-however empty the threat really is-could only increase the pressure for
court action and legislation to deal with conditions allegedly found in the Team-
sters. To some observers of these developments, it seems that Mr. Hoffa is "swing-
ing wildly," a probable indication that he is about to "strike out." Certainly it
would be a mistake to try to deal by legislation or any kind of regulation with that
phase of the truck-driver situation.
"
1 Since both airline and motor-truck labor relations are as yet undeveloped and formless, it might
be possible to deal with both areas through a single governmental agency. Tying that agency to the
National Mediation Board (railway) in any but a loose administrative fashion, however, could only impair
the functioning of both.
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III
THE SHIPPING INDusTRY
Conditions closely analogous to those responsible for the violent labor conflicts
in local industries in the 1920's underlie the recently dramatized efforts of Ameri-
can maritime unions and the International Transportworkers' Federation (ITF)
to bring the "Panlibhonco"' 2 runaway ship operators back under accepted labor
standards.' 3 The common feature in these apparently widely different situations
is the attempt to establish minimum labor standards, by legislation and by col-
lective bargaining, where competitors serving the same market can evade those
standards and operate with substantially lower wages and inferior working condi-
ditions.
In their early efforts at organization, workers in the construction industry, in
service trades, and in such light small-scale industries as apparel manufacturing
were able to improve labor standards in particular plants or areas. Many employers
were very willing to co-operate in making such improvements. Some states
were willing, by legislation, to set reasonable minimum standards for factory
workers. But other employers and other states saw in that progress only an
opportunity for them to undercut competitors who had agreed or were by law
compelled to maintain fair labor standards. Trade unions and employers alike
realized the necessity for complete labor organization of strictly local industry.
State government officials came to understand that only federal legislation (en-
forced by an administration and officials genuinely sympathetic to its purposes)
could make minimum legislative standards effective. The rapid development of
labor organization since 1933 and the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 4
National Labor Relations Act, 5 and the Social Security and Unemployment Com-
pensation Acte have done a great deal to limit the competitive advantage possible
through imposition of low labor standards. Nevertheless, the "runaway shop"
remains a major problem to American labor and industry.
That problem, interstate in other industries, is international in maritime trans-
portation. Federal legislation in the United States had even by 194o accomplished
a great deal in improving conditions for all American ship-operating, maintenance,
and waterfront workers. Labor organization in this country and in the maritime
nations of western Europe became virtually complete at the end of World War
II. The combination of collective bargaining and governmental regulation estab-
lished standards that were high as compared with prewar conditions and with
those prevailing among maritime workers of nations with negligible merchant
marines. American wages and other conditions are substantially better than those
12 See p. 12 infra.
'. Becu, A Unique Trade Union Action, 19 INT'L TRANSPORTWORKE.RS J. I (i959). Cf. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 22, 1959, P. 62, cOl. 3; id., Jan. 23, 1959, P. 49, cl. 2; id., Jan. 28, 1959, p. 6x, col. 4.
1452 Stat. xo6o (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1952).
a"49 Stat. 449 ('935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. SS 151-66 (1952).
16 49 Stat. 62o (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 301-1305 (1952).
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of European maritime workers, which are, in turn, far superior to those of non-
maritime nations.
Thus far, however, there has been nothing to prevent the transfer of ship
operations from the United States or any of the leading maritime nations to
registry under the flag of any other country. American shipowners particularly,
but many from other leading nations as well, have taken advantage of this
opportunity to escape governmental and collective bargaining standards. The four
nations whose "hospitality" to foreign ship companies has been most used are
Panama, Liberia, Honduras, and Costa Rica (hence "Panlibhonco"). The prob-
lem had already become very serious, and strong labor protests were being made,
when by 1950, 3,300,000 tons of shipping were registered "as of" Panama, and
523,000 tons under the Honduran flag, with none recorded as under the Liberian
and Costa Rican flags."
By 1955, the four countries had 8,700,000 tons of shipping registered, with
Liberia having almost half of the total. In 1956, the total had risen to io,400,000
tons, Liberia alone having registered 5,600,000 tons.'" The "Panlibhonco" pro-
portion of the world's merchant marine had risen from five per cent of the total
to ten per cent in six years. Labor spokesmen estimate that at the end of 1958,
the shipping registered under the four flags had risen to 24,000,000 tons,19 or six-
teen per cent of the world total. By comparison, the total shipping under the
American flag had dropped from 27,500,000 tons in 1950 to 26,iooooo tons in
1956, including Great Lakes shipping 20 These figures, though on not exactly the
same basis, are a rough measure of the "Panlibhonco" problem.
Registry under these four "flags of convenience" has been especially used by
American oil companies. In 1946, there were 268 tankers, of 4,200,000 tons, flying
the American flag in foreign trade; in 1957, there were only seventy-two tankers
of 1,400,000 tons.2' Even since i95o, the drop has been just over fifty per cent in
the number, just under fifty per cent in the tonnage, of active tankers of American
registry in foreign trade. American foreign trade, exports and imports, in tankers
in 195o totaled 118,400,000 tons, fifty-three per cent of which was carried under
the American flag; by I957, of the total io8,3ooooo tons of American foreign
trade carried in tankers, only seventeen per cent was in ships of American registry.
On the other hand, not one ship was recorded b'y the Statistical Office of the
United Nations as entering any port of Liberia, Honduras, or Panama in 1955 or
1956 (1957 data have not yet been published). The total freight loaded and
unloaded from ships entering harbors of the fourth country, Costa Rica, was only
'
t U.S. DEP'T oF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 932 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
1 8 Id. at 941 (1958).
I9 Sea Uniogs Push Flqg4ssue Drive; N.Y., Times, Jan. 23, 1959, p. 49, c-l. 2.
2 0 $TATISTICAL ABSTRACT 953 (5957);" id. at 941 "(1958).
'
1 id. at 593 (1958).
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7o0,000 tons in each of the two years.2 2 The four countries have no foreign trade
by sea, but they are among world leaders in merchant marine registry.
Not all of the incentive for the "runaway" registration under these "flags of
convenience" is in wages and working conditions. The ship operators are also
able to avoid a substantial amount in taxation in the countries where the ships
are actually owned. But the labor organizations of the maritime countries rightly
concluded that the practice of "Panlibhonco" registration was a major threat to
labor standards that have been established jointly by law and collective bargaining
in all of the principal maritime countries.
The problem had been under consideration, and some protests had been made,
since 1949 at least. In the fall of 1958, the ITF-a world organization of trans-
portation unions-organized a protest boycott of the "Panlibhonco" ships. The
boycott was planned to last only four days, from November 30 to December 4.
American seamen's unions were most active in urging and organizing the move-
ment; other world-wide labor groups, including the powerful International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions, supported the boycott. Waterfront organizations
affiliated with the ITF refused, during those four days, to unload or otherwise
service the "runaway" ships. Omer Becu, able and energetic Secretary of the ITF,
stated that the boycott was ninety per cent effective. 23  One of the four "con-
venience" nations, Costa Rica, took steps just as the boycott began, to stop the
use of its flag by the "runaway" ship operators. Newspapers and magazines in
all of the maritime countries gave top publicity to the movement. It has been
made clear, ever since the protest was first announced, that it is only a preliminary
to a more widespread and continuing action if the "runaway" practice is not
ended.
No one government can handle this problem satisfactorily, although a great
deal can be done to minimize the abuse. The ITF has called upon the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization to take 'up the question as
part of an effort to get simultaneous action by the several governments most
involved. The real reliance of both the employees and the owners operating under
flags of their own nations is upon the direct economic power of the labor groups,
especially the longshoremen, the ship-repair workers, and the petroleum workers.
Unions of these workers, coordinated through the ITF, can, without doubt, put
enough pressure upon the ship operators to force them to re-establish union con-
ditions, even though under "convenience" flags. The waterfronts of' the world
may see some vigorous action before the situation is stabilized. It is difficult to
understand how United States Government officials can condone,, as some of them
seem to do, the evasion and undermining of our legal standards by "runaway"
American shipowners.
22 ld. at 953 (x957); id. at 941 (1958).
" Sea Unions Push Flag-Issue Drive, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1959, p; 49, COl. 2.
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IV
THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
Turning, finally, to railway transportation, it is to be noted that its current
labor problems originate, for the most part, in technological changes both on the
railways and in other types of transportation. These changes affect railroad em-
ployment in different ways, and there are open to railway employees a variety of
courses for dealing with the problems. Of the changes in other sections of the
industry, the development of highway and airline transportation has had a mul-
tiple effect on both passenger and freight traffic, and employees of the railways.
Within the industry, movements toward merging of companies, facilities, or service
have combined with increased automation to cause heavy displacement of railway
workers.
Private automobiles handled about eighty-five per cent of intercity passenger
traffic in 195o, the airways two per cent, and the railways eight per cent.24 In
1957, the rails and airways had about four per cent each, and private automobiles
about eighty-nine per cent of intercity travel.25 Local transit has been even more
affected by increased use of private automobiles, but no measurement of that local
use has been made. Passengers carried by local transit facilities have declined
approximately fifty per cent since 195o. Railway and local transit phases of this
situation overlap in the commuter service operated into the largest cities by the
railroads.
Passenger service differs from freight service and from manufacturing in-
dustry generally, in that technological change cannot increase its output per em-
ployee man-hour to the same degree. Passenger service is inescapably personal and
individual. Progress in vehicles, power, accounting procedures, ticket machines,
and station operation only makes more clear the fact that there can be relatively
little reduction in the number of transportation employees per thousand passengers,
unless volume increases substantially. Consequently, as wages rise-and they
must go up with the general wage level-passenger costs rise. Those costs must
be met from increased passenger revenues, or some other source must be found
for funds to meet increasing expenses.
In the private-transit section of this problem, part of the difficulty is that
longer hauls per passenger, resulting from outward movement of population in
the cities, can only within narrow limits be met by increased fares; increasing
general fares to meet higher average expense per passenger places an undue part
of the cost on those riding short distances. But in the larger cities, mass trans-
portation is vitally necessary if central business districts are to be kept alive. Traffic
congestion is only increased by improving access of private automobiles to the
central areas through freeways or other street and highway development. The
need for local transit service for community purposes-transportation of school
S"ICC, 65"a Am. REP. 20 (ig5i).
"ICC, 72D ANN. REP. iO (1958).
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children, for instance-cannot otherwise be met. These and related considerations
have resulted in various kinds of subsidies for mass transportation in the larger
cities; and in seven of these principal metropolitan areas, the facilities are now
publicly owned and operated.2
In the railway section of this general passenger problem, the managements
claim that passenger service is operated at a deficit, made good out of freight
revenues. The accuracy of that statement depends upon the method of account-
ing for the joint operations of the industry, but there can be no doubt that pas-
senger service is less remunerative than freight service. Railway' companies try
to increase net passenger revenues by reducing or discontinuing service that has
a high ratio of expenses to revenues. There is evidence that some roads would
prefer to discontinue all passenger service. Any such reduction or discontinuance
of service has an immediate effect on railway employment.
State regulatory commissions have had, until last year, major responsibility for
permitting or prohibiting reductions of railway passenger service, including com-
muter operations. Local communities to be adversely affected by such changes
have joined with railway workers in urging that service be maintained. Although
very great reductions have been authorized by state commissions, the railways have
felt that greater freedom should be given them. Railway officials in 1958 asked
Congress to amend the Interstate Commerce Act so as to give final authority in
any proposed reduction of service to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Con-
gress, in the Transportation Act of 1958, granted that request; state commissions
now have greatly reduced control over even intrastate railway service as a result
of that law.F
It has already become clear that the operation of the new provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act will intensify the railway unemployment problem. The
Commission has, and has exercised, the right in approving abandonments of
service to attach conditions requiring a carrier to protect railway employees ad-
versely affected. The conditions that have come to be considered standard under
such circumstances are the "Burlington conditions," imposed by the Commission in
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. Abandonment.28 They include monthly supplementary
or unemployment allowances to employees, continuance of employee rights during
furlough, payment of moving costs to employees forced to move to retain employ-
ment, and reimbursement for losses by employees forced to sell homes. These
particular conditions, attached to railway abandonments, are only a specific ap-
plication of principles that have for years been given general acceptance by col-
lective bargaining, by law, and by Commission action where proposed railway
changes affected employees adversely. But in a decision under section i3a of the
Interstate Commerce Act (added by the Transportation Act of 1958), the Commis-
"New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, Detroit, Cleveland, and San Francisco.
27 72 Star. 571, 49 U.S.C.A. § 13a (Supp. 1958).
28 257 I.C.C. 700 (1944).
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sion has now ruled that in the discontinuance of single trains, it does not have
the power to impose conditions for the protection of employees2 The resulting
unemployment, in the one action, will be small; but to railway employees gen-
erally, the action of the Commission will be a major defeat and will threaten
heavy future losses..
So far as the commuter aspects of the general railway program to curtail
passenger service is concerned, it seems likely that some method of subsidy will
be developed to secure continued operation. The problem is serious only in a
relatively few large cities. One of those cities granted a temporary subsidy to one
railroad, pending study and final action on the whole questionY0 Different ap-
proaches will doubtless be used in different cities, some of them perhaps including
public operation of commuter rail service as an adjunct to local transit facilities
already publicly-owned.
But the discontinuance of passenger and other rail service under the new
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act may add greatly to an unemployment
situation already acute. More than 20oooo railway workers were on the un-
employment rolls in the later months of 1958, 8oooo more than in the same period
of 1957. There were 140,00o drawing unemployment benefits in September, a
month normally of high employment. Quantitatively this is a critical situation.'
Moreover, the quality of railway unemployment is as disturbing to the employees
as the quantity. A detailed study of unemployment, made for the twelve-year period
1946-58, analyzed the character of that unemployment. Of 308,000 who received
unemployment compensation in the benefit year 1957-58, i47,ooo were over forty
years of age. These older employees averaged more than eight weeks of unemploy-
ment compensation. Relative unemployment of senior employees was much greater
in 1957-58 than it had been in earlier years, and a greater proportion of the older
unemployed exhausted the benefits to which they were entitled. Yet, the carrier
employment policies seemed to have been established without regard to that situa-
tion.32 In the calendar year 1957, the carriers hired 95,ooo new employees without
previous experience in the industry, 3 while 27oooo were being separated and 75,000
were unemployed long enough to exhaust their benefits,34 more than half of those
29 Great Northern Ry. Co. Discontinuance of Service, Williston, N.D.-Watford City, N.D.-Richcy,
Mont., ICC, No. 20348, Feb. 6, 1959. Cf. Traffic World, Feb. i5, x959, p. I; Railway Age, Feb. x6,
1959, P. 14.
30 The N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R. was authorized to abandon its Old Colony Line in Massachusetts. The
Special Legislative Railroad Commission recommended that the company be paid $900,000 a year subsidy
to keep the Old Colony line in service-the City of Boston to provide $25o,ooo and remainder to
be levied on 37 communities along the line. The state legislature and the courts approved the recommenda-
tion, and it was made effective. On July 1, 1959, the Old Colony Line was abandoned; however, a
section from Boston to Braintree (io miles) was purchased by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
under authority of an act of the legislature, with the governor's approval. Moody's Transportation, July
18, 1958, p. 1317; id., Iul'y 4, 958, p. 1338; id., July 1, 1958, p. 1345; Passenger Transport, Sept. 4,
1959, P- 3-
, Railroad Retirement Board- Monthly Review, Dec. 1958, p. 15 .
" See statement from Office ' Director of Research, Railroad Retirement Board, March 1, 1957.
8 RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD ANN. REP. 204, table E-2 (1958).
"I1d. at 186, table D-27.
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over forty years of age.a There is no record of those who found nonrailroad em-
ployment before exhausting their benefits.
The Railroad Retirement Board, administering: the Railroad .Ufierihployment
Insurance Act,36 maintains a placement service and exerts all, possible effori to
persuade the carriers to 'hire experienced railroad men from among the unem-
ployed. Those efforts have been attended with only slight success; in 1956, 27,000
unemployed claimants were placed,17 while the roads were hiring 14oooo em-
ployees without railway experience3 8 There has been a little improvement in
recent months, but placement is still a small fraction of separations or of natural
turnover.
Railway unemployment is a function, in part, of seasonal fluctuations, which
railway employees consider to be susceptible of great reduction, with increased
over-all efficiency, if management policies were changed. Part of railway unem-
ployment results from the unification of facilities on individual roads or between
railroads. Another part of the total is due to changes in equipment or processes,
including automation, itself made more possible by consolidation of railroad
offices or other facilities. Employment could be reduced over a long period,
without unemployment, through natural turnover, if displaced employees were
given positions made vacant by deaths, retirement, or resignation. This has been
the basis of railway labor unemployment proposals for at least thirty years.
Railway employees have three approaches to this compound unemployment
problem. It is a cardinal principle in both union and governmental railway labor
policy that the savings resulting from unifications, consolidations, or similar
changes should be used, in part, to cushion the effect of the resulting unemploy-
ment. This principle was written into the Emergency Railroad Transportation
Act of I933as' It is embodied in the "Washington Agreement of 1936" between
managements and unions,4" in the Interstate Commerce Act,4 and in many de-
cisions of the ICC, even where the statutory requirement is not definite4 2  Appli-
cation of the principle includes allowance for the fact that many railway workers
are employed in small towns, where there is no other employment, but where
railway service has required skilled workers. In such towns, homes are often
not for rent, and many railway employees have had to buy or build their own.
When railroad reshuffling moves a service or a facility from such a town, the
" Id. at 185, table D-26.
Be 52 Stat. 1094 (1938), 45 U.S.C. §§ 351-67 (1952).
" See statement by Bureau of Unemployment and Sickness Insurance, Railroad Retirement Boara,
March a, 1957.
"See RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD ANN. REP. 178, table D-2 (1957).
48 Stat. 211 (expired June 17, 1936).
4oHearings Be/ore the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2531, Omnibus
Transportation Bill, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 2, at 231-41 (1939).
2 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f) (I95").
'2Cf. United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (939); ICC v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 315
U.s. 373 (1942); Railway Labor Executives Ais'n v. United States, 339 U.S. 142 (1950); The New
Orleans Union Passenger Terminal Case, 282 I.C.C. 271 (1952).
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employees must move, transporting their families and household goods, and
selling their homes at whatever price they will bring in a collapsing real estate
market. Railway workers have been able to get some degree of protection under
such circumstances by the methods mentioned above. Their concern now is
greatly heightened by the fact that the "Washington Agreement" needs extension
to cover today's problems, and the recent amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act relative to abandonments or curtailments of service is a drastic change in gov-
ernment policy.
The two approaches, through direct collective bargaining or through legislative
and ICC protection of displaced workers, tie in with the third course open to
railway workers. The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act now provides com-
pensation up to $8.50 per day for not more than twenty-six weeks in a benefit
year.43 The cost of unemployment compensation is borne entirely by the carriers,
and the payroll tax to meet the cost may rise or fall with the volume of un-
employment. The Act is administered by the Railroad Retirement Board, one
of the three members of which, by law, must be chosen from among persons named
by the unions, and one from among management nominees.
Congress has recently enacted a statute that extends the period during which
unemployment compensation will be paid to senior employees, and increases
the compensation from the present fifty per cent to sixty per cent of the employee's
earnings, with a maximum of $io.2o per day44  Railway employees urged this
legislation both as a measure of justice to displaced older workers, many of
whom are highly skilled in railway service but without skill for any outside
employment, and as an incentive to the carriers to rehire experienced senior em-
ployees rather than to recruit new workers from outside the industry.
This legislation and all other efforts by railway employees to deal with the
grave unemployment crisis have run head-on into a national publicity campaign of
unprecedented intensity by railway managements. In the closing months of 1957
and the first eight months of 1958, the carriers experienced a recession in traffic
and revenues somewhat more than proportionate to the national decline. Recovery
has been marked since September 1958. That is a standard, recurrent situation;
any general drop in business brings about a drop in railway traffic of a little
greater size, because inventory adjustment invariably means that the movement
of goods drops more than either production or sales. On the other hand, as in-
distries build inventories, - with mounting business activity, more goods are
transported than are currently being produced or sold. During each of the brief
postwar recessions, railway management statements have seemed to indicate a
belief that complete, 'final disaster was upon them. Demands for governmental
assistance and vigorous attacks upon employees have marked each of those
.. 69 Stat. 7.16 (1955), 45 U.S.C. § 352 (Supp. V, 1958).
"73 Stat. 30, 45 U.S.C.A. § 351, 352 (1959)-
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temporary dips in rail revenues. But the current campaign has been carried to
lengths far greater than the 1949 or 1953 publicity drives.45
One aspect of this current publicity that threatens serious conflict is the demand
for specific changes in the working rules of operating employees.3 Those rules
were set up, for the most part, before World War I. They govern an incentive
wage system. Many industries had such systems in the early years of this century,
and at that time, the railway practices were no doubt as favorable to the employees
as any in existence. Since then, railway technological change has combined with
the improvement of incentive wage systems to make the railway rules appear
inappropriate and out of adjustment. Significant movements for revisions were
undertaken by operating employees in 1943, 1953, and 1955. Union requests for
modification of parts of the wage structure were, in general, approved in each of
those movements. The carriers have asked for changes in recent years, but have
abandoned their proposals during collective bargaining. Current carrier publicity
makes much of the fact that the standard task of railway road-service men is
expressed in terms of hours and days, and that it is an apparent anachronism to
say that ioo miles is an eight-hour day's work. Other apparent anachronisms in
the wage structure of operating men have less publicity appeal. But a thorough
study of the rules under which the incentive wage system functions will show
many particulars in which railway operating men have been less favored than
workers under other incentive wage systems.
Total employment on Class I carriers was over 2,000,000 in I920,47 1,500,ooo in
,930,4 s and 1,25oooo in 1950 9  The lowest annual average, until now, had been
the 1938 figure of 939,000o 0 In December 1956, there were i,oi6,ooo railway
employees; in December 1957, 919,ooo;51 and in December 1958, 824,000.52 In
1957, the railways handled thirty per cent more traffic than in 1929, with forty
per cent fewer employees; hence, the output per man-hour was 15o per cent greater
in 1957 than in I929P 3 Employment today is lower than it has been at any time
in this century; man-hour productivity, at an all time peak.
Some comparative figures for other industries are available. From 1939 to
1953, man-hour productivity in all United States manufacturing increased by
"
5 Management 'Featherbed'?, Railway Age, Feb. 23, 1959, p. IO; Wall Street Journal, Oct. x4, 1959,
P. 4; id., Oct. 19, 1959, p. 12; id., Oct. 27, 1959, p. 27. Similar advertisements have been carried in
daily and weekly newspapers throughout the United States since the February 23d inauguration of the
campaign.
"Management 'Featherbed'?, Feb. I6, 1959, PP. 9, 13.
• ICC, STATISTICS OF RAiLWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES XiX (1920).
,
8 1d., table 63, at S-53 (1930).
' ICC, TRANSPORT STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES pt. I, table 63, at 48 (1957).
:0 See note 48 supra.
' ICC, STATEMENT No. M-3oo, WAGE STATISTICS OF CLASS I RAILROADS (1957).
"Number of Employees at Middle of Month, ICC Preliminary Release, Dec. 1958.
" ICC, STATFENT No. 25, STATISTICS OF RILWAYS IN THE -UNITED STATES, PRODUCTIVITY AND
TRAFFIC xlix (1929); id., STATEMENT No. x6, STATISTIcS OF RAILWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES, EMPLOY-
MENT XXXVi (1929); id., TRANSPORT STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES table 44, at 30 (1957); id., table
63, at 48.
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twenty-eight per cent; 54 man-hour productivity of railway workers increased by
fifty-nine per centY5 From 1947 to 1957, real product per man-hour in nonfarm
industry rose 28.6 per cent;58 railway output rose 46.3 per cent per man-hour 7
These railway data include all traffic, passenger as well as freight.
The resentment felt by railway workers over the widely disseminated charges
of "featherbedding," when their man-hour productivity has far outrun employee
productivity in American industry generally, is heightened by the seemingly in-
different attitude of the carriers toward the heavy volume of railway unemploy-
ment. Railway employees also feel that the carriers' tactics have seriously crippled
grievance procedures under the Railway Labor Act and have compounded the
offense by forcing into its creaking compulsory-arbitration machinery disputes of
a kind that should be handled under other sections of the Railway Labor Act.
The railway labor situation is critical, more so now than it has been for per-
haps a quarter century. Current wage agreements became subject to change
as of November i, i959 s Legislation affecting railway unemployment compensa-
tion is also at a critical stage. Carrier publicity has angered railway employees,
arousing a great deal of bitterness, and the success of carrier demands for freedom
in reducing service without regard for displaced employees will heap more fuel
on that fire. The announced carrier intention to ask amendment of the working
rules in ways that will adversely affect employment is explosive, particularly the
proposal to run American freight trains and switch engines with only one man
in the locomotive cab. It is not too much to say that war has been declared by
the railway managements; it seems unlikely that anything which can be done by
way of new legislation or by improved administration of that now on the statute
books can avert a major crisis if the railways persist in their announced program.
CONCLUSION
Apart from any specific legislation aimed at any part of the railway or other
transportation labor problems, it should be kept in mind that any changes in
regulation of transportation will have a more or less direct effect upon employ-
ment and labor relations. The paradox of close governmental regulation of the
industry and simultaneous government dedication to "free private competitive
enterprise" makes it difficult to predict what form the transportation policy of the
future will take. Railway managements again are urging their program of whole-
"' U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. No. Ioo, TRENDS IN OUTPUT PER MAN-
Hom AND Ms-Houas PER UNIT OF OUTPUT, MANUFACTURING, 1939-53, table 4, at 315 (955).
"
5 1d., REP. No. 1o5, TRENDS IN OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR, 1935-55, table 6, at 8 (1956).
" U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF INDEXES OF LABOR AND NoN-
LABOR PAYMSENTS, PRIcEs, REAL EARNINGS, AND PRODUCTIVITY FOR THE PRIVATE NONFARM SECTOR OF TIE
ECONOMY, 1947-57, at 2 (1958).
T STATISTICAL ABSTRACT table 281, at 226 (958).
" Formal requests for wage increases have been served by organization's representing all railway em-
ployees, and railway managements have countered with proposals for wage decreases. Management
h s also proposed drastic changes in virtually all basic working rules of the operating employees. Railway
Age, Nov. 2, 1959, P. 9.
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sale consolidations. The late Mr. Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of
Transportation under the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, and
for many years a leading member of the ICC, seemed to favor integration of
various types of transportation around a unified and public-owned railway system.
Whether or not this may be the basis of transportation policy at some time in the
future, it has no substantial support now among labor, management, government
officials, or the general public.
Whatever may be the form of national transportation policy, it should recognize
the fact that the need for adequate, efficient, and economical service can be met
only if employee morale can be maintained. That, in turn, requires that trans-
portation wages and working conditions progress in step with those in American
industry generally and that the industry's technological readjustments be handled
so as to impose a minimum of avoidable hardship upon the employees. Railway
workers, by their responsible and intelligent attitude toward their own and the
industry's problems, have earned and have been given the right to participate
in determining transportation policy. That right should not now be curtailed;
on the contrary, it should be extended to other groups of transportation workers
as their organizations demonstrate the requisite responsibility.
